Facebook的CEO小扎同学因为前段时间Facebook的用户数据泄漏事件，前往国会参加听证会，接受美国参议院44名参议员的质问。

在第一场听证会中，扎克伯格与44名参议员鏖战5个小时，谈了关于数据丑闻、关于垄断、关于监听用户等多个问题。

面对44名参议员的尖锐发问，小扎同学顶住压力，沉稳应答，不仅诚意的道歉，还扭转了局势，展示了一个漂亮的危机公关案例，赢得了一致好评还圈了不少粉，Facebook股价一度大涨。

其实，在本次听证会上，小扎同学的精彩回答我们完全可以现学现用，学习借鉴他的逻辑思路，应用到我们的托福写作中，让我们的作文脱颖而出，满分再也不是梦！

小扎尴尬又不失礼貌的微笑小扎本次准备的证词有理有据，我们下面以他准备的关于剑桥分析公司数据泄露以及俄罗斯大选干扰两个论述为例，简析针对托福命题写作我们应该如何展开。

TIP提前看

★话题引入不必过长。因为下面还有大量篇幅等待展开。

★陈述问题可按照时间顺序，条理更加清晰。

★ 段首亮明论点，然后展开。比较难理解的论点可以先解释一下，然后可以讲述一下给出论点理由以及具体措施等等，用事实数字更能增强说服力。

★总结简单明了。简短总结一下文章目的，也可以展望一下未来。

CAMBRIDGE ANALYTICA

剑桥分析公司

证词目的

陈述Facebook对于剑桥分析公司数据泄露的问题高度重视，并采取了有效措施。

证词框架

★话题引入

★发生了什么问题？

★如何来解决问题：

①维护我们的平台；

②调查其他应用程序；

③构建更好的管控措施。

★总结

证词原文

Over the past few weeks, we've been working to understand exactly what happened with Cambridge Analytica and taking steps to make sure this doesn't happen again. We took important actions to prevent this from happening again today four years ago, but we also made mistakes, there's more to do, and we need to step up and do it.

在过去的几个星期里，我们一直在努力了解剑桥分析公司到底发生了什么，并采取措施确保这种情况不会再次发生。我们采取了重要的行动来防止这种四年前发生情况今天再次发生，但是我们也犯了错误，还有更多的事情要做，我们需要站出来完成这些事情。

【话题引入】开头段简单陈述问题，承认错误，并表明会承担责任采取措施。

What Happened  

 发生了什么事?

In 2007,we launched the Facebook Platform with the vision that more apps should be social. Your calendar should be able to show your friends' birthdays, your maps should show where your friends live, and your address book should show their pictures. To do this, we enabled people to log into apps and share who their friends were and some information about them.

2007年，我们推出了Facebook平台，其愿景是更多的应用应该是社会性的。你的日历应该能够显示你朋友的生日，你的地图应该显示你的朋友住在哪里，你的地址簿应该显示他们的照片。为了做到这一点，我们让人们登录应用程序，分享他们的朋友和他们的一些信息。

In 2013,a Cambridge University researcher named Aleksandr Kogan created a personality quiz app. It was installed by around 300,000 people who agreed to share some of their Facebook information as well as some information from their friends whose privacy settings allowed it. Given the way our platform worked at the time this meant Kogan was able to access some information about tens of millions of their friends.

2013年，剑桥大学(Cambridge University)的一名研究人员亚历山大-科根(Aleksandr Kogan)创建了一款个性测试应用程序，它被约30万名用户安装，他们同意分享一些他们在Facebook上的信息，以及一些他们朋友的信息，这些朋友的隐私设置允许这些信息被访问。考虑到我们的平台当时的运作方式，这意味着科根能够访问数以百万计的用户朋友的信息。

In 2014,to prevent abusive apps, we announced that we were changing the entire platform to dramatically limit the Facebook information apps could access. Most importantly, apps like Kogan's could no longer ask for information about a person's friends unless their friends had also authorized the app. We also required developers to get approval from Facebook before they could request any data beyond a user's public profile, friend list, and email address. These actions would prevent any app like Kogan's from being able to access as much Facebook data today.

2014年，为了防止应用程序被滥用，我们宣布，我们正在改变整个平台，以极大地限制Facebook信息应用程序的访问权限。最重要的是，像科根这样的应用程序，除非用户的朋友也授权了这个应用程序，否则该应用就不能再询问一个用户的朋友的信息了。我们还要求开发人员在这些引用可以请求用户的公开资料、好友列表和电子邮件地址等任何数据之前，先得到Facebook的批准。这些行动将会阻止像科根这样的应用程序能够在今天访问大量的Facebook数据。

In 2015,we learned from journalists at The Guardian that Kogan had shared data from his app with Cambridge Analytica. It is against our policies for developers to share data without people's consent, so we immediately banned Kogan's app from our platform, and demanded that Kogan and other entities he gave the data to, including Cambridge Analytica, formally certify that they had deleted all improperly acquired data — which they ultimately did.

2015年，我们从《卫报》记者那里了解到，科根与剑桥分析公司分享了他的应用数据。这违背了我们的政策，开发人员共享数据未经用户同意,我们立即禁止了科根的应用平台,并要求科根和其他其所分享数据的公司（包括剑桥分析）,正式证明他们已经删除所有他们不正当获取的数据。

Last month,we learned from The Guardian, The New York Times and Channel 4 that Cambridge Analytica may not have deleted the data as they had certified. We immediately banned them from using any of our services. Cambridge Analytica claims they have already deleted the data and has agreed to a forensic audit by a firm we hired to investigate this. We're also working with the U.K. Information Commissioner's Office, which has jurisdiction over Cambridge Analytica, as it completes its investigation into what happened.

上个月，我们从《卫报》、《纽约时报》和电视新闻第四频道中了解到，剑桥分析公司可能没有删除他们已经被认证删除的数据。我们立即禁止了他们使用我们的任何服务。剑桥分析公司声称他们已经删除了这些数据，并同意由我们雇佣的一家公司进行司法审计。我们还与英国信息专员办公室合作，该办公室对剑桥分析公司有管辖权，并对发生的事情进行了调查。

【发生了什么问题？】按照时间顺序依次陈述问题发生经过，给出报纸新闻等信息渠道证明信息的可靠性。

What We Are Doing

我们正在做什么?

We have a responsibility to make sure what happened with Kogan and Cambridge Analytica doesn't happen again. Here are some of the steps we're taking:

我们有责任确保科根和剑桥分析公司发生的事情不会再发生。以下是我们采取的一些步骤：

①Safeguarding our platform.We need to make sure that developers like Kogan who got access to a lot of information in the past can't get access to as much information going forward. We made some big changes to the Facebook platform in 2014 to dramatically restrict the amount of data that developers can access and to proactively review the apps on our platform. This makes it so a developer today can't do what Kogan did years ago.

① 维护我们的平台。我们需要确保像科根这样在过去获得了大量信息的开发者无法获得更多的信息。2014年，我们在Facebook平台上做了一些大的改变，以极大地限制开发者可以访问的数据量，并在我们的平台上积极地审查应用程序。这使得为今天的开发人员无法完成科根多年前做的数据窃取的事情。

【第一个分论点】段首给出论点“维护我们的平台”，接着给出这样做的理由。然后介绍Facebook曾在这方面所做的努力。

But there's more we can do here to limit the information developers can access and put more safeguards in place to prevent abuse.

但是，我们在限制信息开发者可以访问的信息方面还可以做得更多，并设置更多的安全措施来防止滥用。

★We're removing developers' access to your data if you haven't used their app in three months.

如果你在三个月内没有使用过他们的应用程序，我们将移除开发者对你数据的访问权限。

★We're reducing the data you give an app when you approve it to only your name, profile photo, and email address. That's a lot less than apps can get on any other major app platform.

当你批准一个应用时，我们将你分享的个人信息限制在你的名字，个人资料照片和电子邮件地址。这些信息比应用程序在任何其他主要应用平台上获得的信息都要少得多。

★ We're requiring developers to not only get approval but also to sign a contract that imposes strict requirements in order to ask anyone for access to their posts or other private data.

我们要求开发人员不仅要获得批准，还要签署一份合同，合同对请求访问用户的帖子或其他私人数据做了严格的要求。

★We're restricting more APIs like groups and events. You should be able to sign into apps and share your public information easily, but anything that might also share other people's information — like other posts in groups you're in or other people going to events you're going to — will be much more restricted.

我们限制更多的API，比如群组和活动。你应该能够登录应用程序，轻松地分享你的公共信息，但是任何可能分享他人信息的东西——比如你所在的群组里的其他帖子或者你将要参加的活动——都会受到更大的限制。

★Two weeks ago, we found out that a feature that lets you look someone up by their phone number and email was abused. This feature is useful in cases where people have the same name, but it was abused to link people's public Facebook information to a phone number they already had. When we found out about the abuse, we shut this feature down.

两个星期前，我们发现了一个让你通过电话号码和电子邮件查找某人的功能被滥用了。这个功能在区分拥有相同名字用户的情况下是有用的，但它被滥用于将人们的公共Facebook信息与他们的电话号码联系起来。当我们发现滥用的时候，我们关闭了这个功能。

【第一个分论点-延伸】用一个转折指出Facebook还有很多可以做的，接着利用We‘re doing 4个整齐的句式说明Facebook的努力方向，并以两周前的一个具体事例说明Facebook的应对措施行之有效。

②Investigating other apps.We're in the process of investigating every app that had access to a large amount of information before we locked down our platform in 2014. If we detect suspicious activity, we'll do a full forensic audit. And if we find that someone is improperly using data, we'll ban them and tell everyone affected.

② 调查其他应用程序。我们正在调查在2014年我们锁定平台之前，每一个能获得大量信息的应用程序。如果我们发现可疑的活动，我们将进行全面的法务审查。如果我们发现有人不正当地使用数据，我们会禁止他们，并向外界公布。

【第二个分论点】段首给出论点“调查其他应用程序”，然后介绍Facebook正在这方面所做的努力，以及一旦发现问题立马采取措施。

③Building better controls.Finally, we're making it easier to understand which apps you've allowed to access your data. This week we started showing everyone a list of the apps you've used and an easy way to revoke their permissions to your data. You can already do this in your privacy settings, but we're going to put it at the top of News Feed to make sure everyone sees it. And we also told everyone whose Facebook information may have been shared with Cambridge Analytica.

③ 构建更好的管控措施。最后，我们让你更容易理解哪些应用程序可以访问你的数据。本周，我们开始向每个人展示你所使用的应用程序列表，以及一个简单的方法来撤销这些应用对你的数据的权限。你可以在你的隐私设置中更改设置，但是我们将把该设置选项放在新闻提要的顶部以确保每个人都能看到它。我们还告诉每个用户，他们的Facebook信息可能已经与剑桥分析公司共享。

【第三个分论点】段首给出论点“构建更好的管控措施”，解释具体操作方法。

Beyond the steps we had already taken in 2014, I believe these are the next steps we must take to continue to secure our platform.

除了我们在2014年已经采取的措施之外，我相信以上这些是我们必须采取的下一步措施，以此来确保我们的平台安全。

【总结】简短总结以上陈述，前后呼应。

RUSSIAN ELECTION INTERFERENCE

俄罗斯大选干扰

请点击此处输入图片描述

证词目的

陈述Facebook对于俄罗斯大选干扰的问题高度重视，并采取了有效措施。

证词框架

★话题引入

★发生了什么问题？

★如何来解决问题：

① 建立新技术以防止滥用；

② 大幅增加我们在安全方面的投资；

③ 加强我们的广告策略；

④ 共享信息。

★论点补充

★总结

证词原文

Facebook's mission is about giving people a voice and bringing people closer together. Those are deeply democratic values and we're proud of them. I don't want anyone to use our tools to undermine democracy. That's not what we stand for.

Facebook的使命是给人们一个声音，让人们彼此走得更近。这些都是非常民主的价值观，我们为它们感到骄傲。我不希望任何人使用我们的工具来破坏民主。这不是我们主张的。

We were too slow to spot and respond to Russian interference, and we're working hard to get better. Our sophistication in handling these threats is growing and improving quickly. We will continue working with the government to understand the full extent of Russian interference, and we will do our part not only to ensure the integrity of free and fair elections around the world, but also to give everyone a voice and to be a force for good in democracy everywhere.

我们对俄罗斯的大选干预反应迟钝，我们正在努力地改进。我们处理这些威胁的熟练程度正在迅速提高。我们将继续与政府合作,了解俄罗斯的干扰,并且我们将做我们应做的一切，不仅确保世界各地的自由和公平选举的完整性,但也给每个人一个声音并为无处不在的民主提供力量。

【话题引入】开头段简单陈述问题，承认错误，并表明会承担责任采取措施。

What Happened

发生了什么事?

Elections have always been especially sensitive times for our security team, and the 2016 U.S. presidential election was no exception.

对于我们的安全团队来说，总统大选一直是特别敏感的时刻，2016年美国总统大选也不例外。

Our security team has been aware of traditional Russian cyber threats — like hacking and malware — for years. Leading up to Election Day in November 2016, we detected and dealt with several threats with ties to Russia. This included activity by a group called APT28, that the U.S. government has publicly linked to Russian military intelligence services.

我们的安全团队多年来一直意识到传统的来自俄罗斯的网络威胁——比如黑客和恶意软件。在2016年11月的选举日之前，我们发现并处理了与俄罗斯关系的几个威胁。这包括一个名为APT28的组织的活动，该组织被美国政府公开宣称是俄罗斯军事情报机构。

But while our primary focus was on traditional threats, we also saw some new behavior in the summer of 2016 when APT28-related accounts, under the banner of DC Leaks, created fake personas that were used to seed stolen information to journalists. We shut these accounts down for violating our policies.

但是，尽管我们的主要焦点是传统的威胁，我们也发现了一些新的行为。在2016年夏天，当APT28相关的账户用“DC泄露”的账户名称作为掩护，创建了假人物来给新闻记者提供偷来的信息。由于违反了我们的政策，我们关闭了这些帐户。

After the election, we continued to investigate and learn more about these new threats. What we found was that bad actors had used coordinated networks of fake accounts to interfere in the election: promoting or attacking specific candidates and causes, creating distrust in political institutions, or simply spreading confusion. Some of these bad actors also used our ads tools.

选举结束后，我们继续对这些新威胁进行调查和了解。我们发现，不法分子使用了相互协调的虚假账户网络来干预选举：煽动或攻击特定候选人和目标，在政治机构中制造相互的不信任，或只是散布困惑情绪。一些不法分子也使用了我们的广告工具。

We also learned about a disinformation campaign run by the Internet Research Agency (IRA) — a Russian agency that has repeatedly acted deceptively and tried to manipulate people in the US, Europe, and Russia. We found about 470 accounts and pages linked to the IRA, which generated around 80,000 Facebook posts over about a two-year period.

我们还了解到由互联网研究机构(IRA)发起的一场反信息运动。这是俄罗斯的一个机构，曾多次欺骗并试图操纵美国、欧洲和俄罗斯的人民。我们发现大约有470个账户和页面被链接到了IRA的账户，在大约两年的时间里，该账户发布了约8万个Facebook帖子。

Our best estimate is that approximately 126 million people may have been served content from a Facebook Page associated with the IRA at some point during that period. On Instagram, where our data on reach is not as complete, we found about 120,000 pieces of content, and estimate that an additional 20 million people were likely served it.

我们的估计是，大约有1.26亿人从Facebook页面上获得了与IRA相关的内容。在Instagram上，我们的数据还不完善，但我们已经发现了大约12万份相关内容，估计还会有2千万人获得了与此相关的内容。

Over the same period, the IRA also spent approximately $100,000 on more than 3,000 ads on Facebook and Instagram, which were seen by an estimated 11 million people in the United States. We shut down these IRA accounts in August 2017.

在同一时期，IRA也在Facebook和Instagram上花费了大约10万美元，购买了3000多份广告，这些广告可以被美国大约1100万的用户看到。我们在2017年8月关闭了IRA账户。

【发生了什么问题？】从某一事件引入，给出具体数字补充事实细节。

What We Are Doing

我们正在做什么?

There's no question that we should have spotted Russian interference earlier, and we're working hard to make sure it doesn't happen again. Our actions include:

毫无疑问，我们应该早点发现俄罗斯的干预，我们正在努力确保这种情况不会再次发生。我们的做法包括:

①Building new technology to prevent abuse. Since 2016, we have improved our techniques to prevent nation states from interfering in foreign elections, and we've built more advanced AI tools to remove fake accounts more generally. There have been a number of important elections since then where these new tools have been successfully deployed. For example:

① 建立新技术以防止滥用。自2016年以来，我们已经改进了防止外国干预选举的技术，我们已经建立了更先进的人工智能工具，以更广泛地清除虚假账户。自那时以来，世界已经进行了若干次重要的选举，这些新工具已成功部署。例如:

In France,leading up to the presidential election in 2017, we found and took down 30,000 fake accounts.

在法国，在2017年的总统选举中，我们发现并删除了3万个虚假账户。

In Germany,before the 2017 elections, we worked directly with the election commission to learn from them about the threats they saw and to share information.

在德国，在2017年选举之前，我们与选举委员会直接合作，向他们学习他们所看到的威胁并分享了信息。

In the U.S. Senate Alabama special election last year,we deployed new AI tools that proactively detected and removed fake accounts from Macedonia trying to spread misinformation.

在去年的美国参议院阿拉巴马州的特别选举中，我们部署了新的人工智能工具，积极地检测和清除了马其顿的虚假账户，这些账户曾试图传播错误信息。

We have disabled thousands of accounts tied to organized, financially motivated fake news spammers. These investigations have been used to improve our automated systems that find fake accounts.

我们已经禁用了数千个与有组织的、有财务动机的假新闻垃圾邮件发送者相关的账户。这些调查已经被用来改进我们的自动系统和发现虚假账户。

Last week,we took down more than 270 additional pages and accounts operated by the IRA and used to target people in Russia and Russian speakers in countries like Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine. Some of the pages we removed belong to Russian news organizations that we determined were controlled by the IRA.

上周，我们删除了超过270页额外的IRA页面和账户，这些页面和账户都是由IRA账户操作的，目标是影响阿塞拜疆、乌兹别克斯坦和乌克兰等国的俄罗斯和俄罗斯的用户的思想。我们删除的一些我们认为有IRA控制的俄罗斯新闻机构。

【第一个分论点】段首给出论点“建立新技术以防止滥用”，接着，给出三次大选具体事例，说明Facebook一直致力于此，并不断提升技术，最后给出一个两周前的案例增强说服力。

②Significantly increasing our investment in security.We now have about 15,000 people working on security and content review. We'll have more than 20,000 by the end of this year. I've directed our teams to invest so much in security — on top of the other investments we're making — that it will significantly impact our profitability going forward. But I want to be clear about what our priority is: protecting our community is more important than maximizing our profits.

② 大幅增加我们在安全方面的投资。我们现在有大约15000人从事安全和内容审查工作。到今年年底，该数字将会增加到20000个。我已经指示我们的团队在安全方面除了我们正在进行的其他投资外，投入更多的资金，这将极大地影响我们未来的盈利能力。但我想明确的是，我们的首要任务是：保护我们的社区比最大化我们的利润更重要。

【第二个分论点】段首给出论点“大幅增加我们在安全方面的投资”，接着介绍说明Facebook为此所做的努力。

③Strengthening our advertising policies.We know some Members of Congress are exploring ways to increase transparency around political or issue advertising, and we're happy to keep working with Congress on that. But we aren't waiting for legislation to act.

③ 加强我们的广告策略。我们知道，一些国会议员正在探索提高政治或发行广告透明度的方法，我们很高兴能继续与国会合作。但我们不会等到立法之后才会行动。

(1) From now on, every advertiser who wants to run political or issue ads will need to be authorized. To get authorized, advertisers will need to confirm their identity and location. Any advertiser who doesn't pass will be prohibited from running political or issue ads. We will also label them and advertisers will have to show you who paid for them. We're starting this in the U.S. and expanding to the rest of the world in the coming months.

从现在起，每一个想经营政治或发行广告的广告商都需要得到授权。为了获得授权，广告商需要确认他们的身份和所在位置。任何未通过的广告商将被禁止经营政治或发行广告。我们也会给他们贴上标签，广告商将必须向你展示谁为他们付费。我们从美国开始，并在接下来的几个月里将向世界其他地区扩张。

(2) For even greater political ads transparency, we have also built a tool that lets anyone see all of the ads a page is running. We're testing this in Canada now and we'll launch it globally this summer. We're also creating a searchable archive of past political ads.

为了更大的政治广告透明度，我们还建立了一个工具，让所有人看到一个页面正在运行的所有广告。我们正在加拿大进行测试，今年夏天我们将在全球推出。我们还创建了一个可搜索过去政治广告的档案。

(3) We will also require people who manage large pages to be verified as well. This will make it much harder for people to run pages using fake accounts, or to grow virally and spread misinformation or divisive content that way. In order to require verification for all of these pages and advertisers, we will hire thousands of more people. We're committed to getting this done in time for the critical months before the 2018 elections in the U.S. as well as elections in Mexico, Brazil, India, Pakistan and elsewhere in the next year.

我们还将要求管理大型页面的人员也得到验证。这将使人们使用虚假账户运行网页或者以这种方式传播错误信息或造成分裂的内容变得更加困难。为了对所有这些页面和广告客户进行验证，我们将雇佣更多的人。我们承诺为2018年美国大选前的关键几个月，以及明年墨西哥、巴西、印度、巴基斯坦和其他地方的选举尽快完成这项工作。

These steps by themselves won't stop all people trying to game the system. But they will make it a lot harder for anyone to do what the Russians did during the 2016 election and use fake accounts and pages to run ads. Election interference is a problem that's bigger than any one platform, and that's why we support the Honest Ads Act. This will help raise the bar for all political advertising online.

这些步骤本身并不能阻止所有不法分子的行为。但是，他们会让任何俄罗斯于2016年大选中所做的不良行为、使用虚假账户和网页来运行广告变得更加困难。选举干预是一个比任何一个平台都要大的问题，这就是我们支持诚实广告法案的原因。这将有助于提高所有在线政治广告的门槛。

【第三个分论点】段首给出论点“大幅增加我们在安全方面的投资”，接着给出3个分论点指出Facebook目前所采取的行动有哪些，最后给出一个总结，为什么要这么做。

④Sharing information. We've been working with other technology companies to share information about threats, and we're also cooperating with the U.S. and foreign governments on election integrity.

④ 共享信息。我们一直在与其他科技公司合作，分享有关威胁的信息，我们也正在与美国和外国政府合作，以确保选举的完整性。

【第四个分论点】段首给出论点“共享信息”，接着解释一下。

At the same time, it's also important not to lose sight of the more straightforward and larger ways Facebook plays a role in elections. In 2016, people had billions of interactions and open discussions on Facebook that may never have happened offline. Candidates had direct channels to communicate with tens of millions of citizens. Campaigns spent tens of millions of dollars organizing and advertising online to get their messages out further. And we organized "get out the vote" efforts that helped more than 2 million people register to vote who might not have voted otherwise.

与此同时，重要的是，不要忽视Facebook在选举中扮演的更直接和更大的角色。2016年，人们在Facebook上进行了数十亿次互动和公开讨论，这可能永远不会再发生。候选人有与数千万公民沟通的直接渠道。竞选团队花了数千万美元在网上组织和宣传，以进一步传达他们的信息。我们组织了“动员投票”的活动，帮助200多万选民登记投票，否则他们可能不会投票。

请点击此处输入图片描述

【补充论点】强调Facebook的重要作用，接着给出2016年大选事实支撑论点。

Security — including around elections — isn't a problem you ever fully solve. Organizations like the IRA are sophisticated adversaries who are constantly evolving, but we'll keep improving our techniques to stay ahead. And we'll also keep building tools to help more people make their voices heard in the democratic process.

安全（包括选举）不是一个你能完全解决的问题。像IRA这样的组织是不断发展的老练的对手，但我们将不断改进我们的技术以保持领先。我们还将继续设计并建立工具，帮助更多的人在民主进程中发出他们的声音。

【总结】总结以上陈述，表明Facebook会不断改进保证选举的公正性。

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